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sale of any security.""2 It seems unlikely that the court could have in-
tended to weaken so substantially such a significant part of the Rule, but
at least insofar as the civil remedy is concerned the effect of its language
could have this result.
In denying the plaintiff the use of the Rule in this case, the court
does not employ all the potential deterrent force it has available. All the
court requires in order to bar a plaintiff from recovery under the Rule is
that he believe that he is using some secret information.33 A different
result in this case would have the effect of reducing the number of
initial false statements, and recovery would not be dependent on the later
actions of the one who received the information. The subsequent action
by the plaintiff does not lessen the evil of giving false statements in the
first place, and should not relieve the defendant of any liability, either civil
or criminal. In short, the subjective intent of the tippee should not lessen
the responsibility of an instigator who has clearly violated the Act him-
self.
ALEXANDER P. SANDS, III
Torts-Liability of Builder-Vendor's Lender for Failure to Protect
Vendee against Defective Home
In Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan Association,1 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that a lender who provided financing for a
subdeveloper had a duty to purchasers to exercise reasonable care to pre-
vent the builder from constructing and selling defective houses. The sub-
developer was inexperienced and undercapitalized, and its lender retained
substantial control over the subdevelopment planning almost to the point
of being an entrepreneur without sharing attendant risks. Connor is a
decision without precedent,2 and it pioneers a new area in a field that was
already in a great state of flux-tort liability in the home-building in-
02 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
286 F. Supp. at 345.
- Cal. 2d -, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (Traynor, C.J., in a 4-3
decision).
' The intermediate appellate court did reach almost the same result, however,
in holding that Great Western owed purchasers of housing built by the subdeveloper
a duty "at least to the extent of protecting these persons from gross structural
hazards." Connor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., 253 Cal. App. 2d -, -, 61 Cal. Rptr.
333, 344 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
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dustry' Before the decision, California subscribed to the fast-developing
majority view that builder-vendors are liable for their negligence to
vendees and third parties who might foreseeably be injured by latent
defects in home design and construction.4 But at least three jurisdictions
have gone further and have held building contractors strictly liable in
tort for the sale of defective homes.'
'See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 99, at 693-96 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER]; Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon
the Rle, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961); Brown, Building Contractor's Liability
After Completion and Acceptance, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 193 (1967) ; Note, Torts
-Recent Extensions in Builder-Veudor's Liability for Defects, 47 N.C.L. REv.
236 (1968); Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Structural Defects
in New Housing, 35 U. Cni. L. REv. 739 (1968).
' Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963) ; Dow
v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958). See PROSSER § 99, at 695
& nn.80-84.
'State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, - Miss. -, 189 So. 2d 113, cert. denied, 386
U.S. 912 (1966) (Mississippi); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d
314 (1965) (New Jersey); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968)
(Texas). The Mississippi decision was based in part on the fact that a manufac-
tured product-a water heater-caused the damage to the home. The court em-
phasized, however, that defendant contractors were held liable not only as retailers
or wholesalers of the water heater but also as builders of the house in which it was
installed. - Miss. at -, 189 So. 2d at 123. The New Jersey decision used some
language that could be interpreted to mean a warranty liability rather than strict
liability in tort. But in Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d
169 (1968), modifying 93 N.J. Super. 49, 224 A.2d 689 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1966), the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that the statute of limitations
and other sales warranty defenses are not applicable in tort suits against builder-
vendors. Other jurisdictions have cited Schipper with approval or spoken of strict
liability, but the fact situation and the language used implies more of a warranty
liability theory than one of strict liability in tort. E.g., F & S Const. Co. v. Berube,
322 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1963); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698
(1966); Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Waggoner v. Midwestern
Dev. Co., - S.D. -, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967) ; Haye v. Century Builders, 52 Wash.
2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
After this case note went to press, Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., - Cal.
App. 2d -, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969) was handed down adding Cali-
fornia to the jurisdictions that hold builder-vendors of defective homes strictly liable
in tort for injuries to users of the homes and their property. Plaintiff homeowner
brought an action for damages as a result of the failure of a heating system against
the builder, a mass-producer of housing. Affirming a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, the court of appeal cited with approval Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,
44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). It observed that "in terms of today's society,
there are no meaningful distinctions between Eichler's mass production and sale
of homes and the mass production and sale of automobiles and . . . the pertinent
overriding policy considerations are the same." - Cal. App. 2d at -, 74 Cal.
Rptr. at 752. The court adopted the arguments made in Schipper that there is
no real opportunity for the buyer effectively to inspect a house for defects and
agreed that the builder-vendor is in the best position to bear the loss. Although
the language of the court implies that strict tort liability for builder-vendors is
[Vol. 47
1969J LIABILITY OF LENDER FOR DEFECTIVE HOMES 991
Connor could presage the application of strict liability to lenders who
finance housing developers in those jurisdictions that hold builder-vendors
strictly liable. This result would supplement favorably the policies behind
holding builder-vendors liable for defective homes in cases where the
lender retains a certain amount of control over the capital loaned.
Arguably, the best policy result that will emerge from the disparity of
liability law in the building field is that both builder-vendors, whether
large or small, and their financial backers who retain any control over the
project, whether one home or a subdevelopment, will be held strictly liable
for any dangerously defective houses sold. With a substantial number
of builder-vendors operating on such dangerously thin capitalization that
plaintiffs with claims against them for defective homes may find it im-
possible to satisfy judgments,' the home-construction industry is an area
in which vicarious liability can be extended to lenders for valid social
policy reasons.
Concededly, Connor involved liability of the lender predicated upon
some fault-negligence-and the holding is revolutionary in extending
the duty of the lender who backs a financially weak contractor to the
vendees of the houses constructed. Since builder-vendors in California
are liable to third-party users of homes for negligence in design and
construction, it is reasonable to assume that Connor also imposes a duty
on lenders that runs to such third parties. But the fact situation and the
policy reasons set forth by the majority are also important in an argu-
ment for extending strict liability to lenders.
The situation in Connor was as follows: defendant Great Western
Savings & Loan agreed to supply funds necessary for two contractors
doing business as the Conejo Development Company to purchase a one-
hundred acre tract and to construct homes thereon. Upon investigating the
developer's financial condition, Great Western learned that it was extreme-
ly weak-the builder-vendor having only $5,000 capital when it started
its development plans.7 Yet Great Western exercised less than normal
care in making the loan and failed to examine the foundation plans, failed
limited to mass developers, these two basic arguments also can be applied to
small builder-vendors of individual houses. See text p. 997 infra. Now that Cali-
fornia has adopted strict tort liability for at least some classes of builder-vendors,
the way has been cleared for holding their lenders strictly liable upon application
of the criteria outlined p. 993 infra.
Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Structural Defects in New
Housing, supra note 3, at 740.
- Cal. 2d at -, 447 P.2d at 613, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
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to require soil tests, and failed "to discover gross structural defects that
it could have discovered by reasonable inspection."' Plaintiffs in two
actions consolidated for trial were home-buyers who suffered serious
property damage when foundations ill-designed for the adobe soil cracked.
Chief Justice Traynor, in reversing the trial court's nonsuit in favor
of defendant Great Western, first concluded that the lender's acts of
omission were sufficient for a finding of a negligent breach of duty to its
shareholders, to whom it owed a duty not to finance defectively-built
homes since the value of security for the construction loans depended on
sound construction.' But he also concluded that the lender was negligent
in failing to take reasonable steps to prevent potential buyers from re-
ceiving defective homes and that it owed a duty of reasonable care to
them. 10
Of great significance to the holding of a duty extending to the buying
public was the finding that Great Western exercised significant control
over the project. It dictated the price of the homes and insisted on sub-
stantial fees in excess of ordinary interest for making the construction loan
to Conejo. It also received an agreement from Conejo to protect it from
lost profits in the event that home-buyers could not be persuaded to obtain
their loans through Great Western. Thus, concluded the majority of the
court, the risk of harm foreseeable to the plaintiffs because of Conejo's
"dangerously thin capitalization" was increased "by the additional pres-
sures on Conejo ensuing from its onerous burdens as a borrower from
Great Western.""
Although California and most other jurisdictions have not yet accepted
the theory of strict liability in tort for builder-vendors, 12 Connor made
8Id. at -, 447 P.2d at 616, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
9 Id.
'1Od. at -, 447 P.2d at 617-19, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377-79. The policy reasons
specifically set forth were that Great Western's transactions were intended to affect
and did affect the plaintiffs to a significant degree; there was a foreseeable risk
of harm to plaintiffs; the certain injury suffered by plaintiffs was closely connected
with Great Western's negligent omissions; substantial moral blame attached to
defendant; and the policy of tort law to prevent future harm called for extension
of duty.11Id. at -, 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
12 See note 5 supra. California has specifically refused to adopt the theory of
strict liability in tort for builder-vendors. Conolley v. Bull, 258 Cal. App. 2d 749,
65 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482,
53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). It is questionable, however, that the most
important reason given for refusal-that a buyer of real property has an oppor-
tunity to inspect for defects-will withstand the language of the California Su-
preme Court in Connor. See text accompanying notes 17-18 infra. The other
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most of the policy arguments that have been advanced for holding builder-
vendors strictly liable for selling defective homes. These arguments gen-
erally have one underlying theory: the builder of a home should stand no
differently in the law than manufacturers of chattels who, in an increasing
number of jurisdictions, 3 are held strictly liable for defective products
unreasonably dangerous to persons or property.' 4 The same arguments
for holding both the manufacturer of chattels and the builder of homes
strictly liable follow quite logically. In Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,
Inc.," a recent case involving a suit against the manufacturer of an
allegedly defective carpet, the New Jersey Supreme Court said,
the great mass of the purchasing public has neither adequate knowledge
nor sufficient opportunity to determine if articles bought or used are
defective. Obviously they must rely upon the skill, care and reputa-
tion of the maker.... [W]hen the manufacturer presents his goods to
the public for sale he accompanies them with a representation that they
are suitable and safe for the intended use.16
Certainly the vast majority of the home-buying public also relies on the
skill, care and reputation of the builder. And if an ordinary citizen is
unable to tell whether carpeting, power tools, and the like are defective in
a manner dangerous to persons or property, he is usually less able to
detect defective conditions in the home he purchases. In Connor, Chief
Justice Traynor pointed out that "the usual buyer of a home, [sic] is ill-
equipped with experience or financial means to discern such structural
reasons set forth by the two cases are also dubious. They suggest that a contractor-
vendor is seldom in a position to limit liability by such devices as express war-
ranties and disclaimers. However, chattel manufacturers, who are often held strictly
liable, are not permitted by most courts to limit liability in these ways because to
do so is considered unconscionable. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mtrs., Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). The final reason for refusal to apply strict
liability to builder-vendors is that an occupant of a building can more easily trace
a defect to the negligence of the builder than a user of a chattel can trace a defect
to the manufacturer. This argument fails to meet the primary economic purpose for
the application of strict liability: The individual earning a profit from his products
or structures should bear the risks of their being defective because he is the most
effective risk-spreader.
See PROSSER § 97, at 678-84.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
Id. at 64-65, 207 A.2d at 311. Accord, Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Cf. Seely v. White
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), which approves
holding manufacturers strictly liable in tort for personal injuries or property dam-
age, but criticizes the result in Santor for allowing recovery for loss of bargain on
the strict liability theory.
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defects.... Moreover a home is not only a major investment for the
usual buyer but also the only shelter he has. Hence it becomes doubly
important to protect him against structural defects .... ,1
The theory often used in the past by courts unwilling to hold builder-
vendors liable even for negligence in construction after a buyer accepted
the house was that he had an opportunity to inspect the house and should
have rejected it if defective.' As a practical matter, however, it simply
is not possible for the average home buyer to detect defects in the home
that he is about to acquire; even an architect would generally be unable
to discover a defective foundation.
Santor also based the strict liability of the manufacturer on the theory
that it could best bear the expense of personal or property injuries sustained
because of defects in a manufactured product, even if not caused by negli-
gence of the defendant.'" This risk-spreading theory may be extended
by logical analogy to builders of homes.20 They have the opportunity to
insure or spread the risks through prices just as do manufacturers of
chattels.
Chief Justice Traynor in Connor adopted the argument that preven-
tion of future harm through the use of tort liability supported holding the
lender liable to the home purchaser for negligence, for "[r]ules that tend
to discourage misconduct are particularly appropriate when applied to an
established industry.' 2' The risk of tort liability may not prevent in-
juries in many areas such as automobile driving, but an established in-
dustry with the habit of considering all of the angles of profit and loss is
apt, as the court's language suggests, to take greater care to protect the
public if it knows it could face damage suits for failure to check and
control its activities. 22 If strict tort liability is applied to builder-vendors
and their financial backers, arguably they would exercise even more dili-
gence to insure the safety of homes.
Courts, then, can rely on these basic reasons for the view that builder-
vendors are strictly liable in tort: risk-spreading by the party most able
to do so, the helplessness and disadvantage of the buyer, prevention of
17 Cal. 2d at -, 447 P.2d at 618, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 378. Compare Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 91, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965) and Humber v. Morton,
426 S.W.2d 554, 561 (Tex. 1968).
'
8See PROSSER § 99, at 694.
1944 N.J. at 65, 207 A.2d at 311-12.
2 chipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
- Cal. 2d at -, 447 P.2d at 618, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
"
2 This idea is also suggested in Brown, supra note 3, at 218.
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future harm, and the general feeling that the party engaging in an enter-
prise for profit should bear the burden if something goes awry. Connor
used the same reasons for holding that the lender had a duty extending
to the home purchaser. It is arguable that California may reasonably
adopt the policies underlying Connor to hold builder-vendors strictly liable.
And with this foundation laid, California logically could go further and
hold lenders in the situation of Great Western strictly liable for defects
in houses sold by builder-vendors that they finance.
Such an ultimate extension can be supported by the language of the
intermediate California appellate court in its treatment of Connor :23
Since we recognize the obligation of the manufacturer who has the
capacity to launch numerous potentially hazardous products on the
market, should we not be prepared to impose similar standards of re-
sponsibility on the experienced and knowledgeable home-lending insti-
tution when it financially launches an untried developer by assisting
him to produce and sell residential units to the uninformed public?24
All of the policy arguments for holding manufacturers and builders
strictly liable for defects in what they produce can be applied with equal
force to savings and loan associations, banks, and other lenders who back
the home-construction industry. The lender is familiar with the entire
transaction and, in all practicality, is the moving force behind most housing
developments today.2 5 Without the lender's money most builder-vendors
could not carry out their projects. Because it controls the capital, the
lender is in the best position to prevent fraud and defectively-designed or
defectively-constructed housing.
Furthermore, lenders are better risk-bearers and risk-spreaders than
are builders and subdevelopers. As the facts in Connor indicate, many
of the builder-vendors in the residential construction field are under-
capitalized and inexperienced; they are often insolvent or no longer in
business by the time defects in their housing are discovered. 2' Thus con-
tractors who build and sell homes, even if held strictly liable for defects
that prove dangerous, will often be too irresponsible or too insolvent to
" Connor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., 253 Cal. App. 2d -, 61 Cal. Rptr. 333
(Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
Id. at -, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
For a good summary of financing of the residential construction industry, see
Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Structural Defects in New
Housing, supra note 3, at 741-48.
"
0 d. at 740.
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have done anything, such as insuring, to spread the risks. Lenders, on the
other hand, generally would tend to be more responsible and see that the
risk is spread in at least two ways-by requiring the builder to insure or
by charging the builder higher interest rates.27
Finally, extension of strict liability to lenders such as Great Western
probably would enhance the possibility of preventing future harm from
defective housing. Lenders logically would take greater precaution in
approving development plans and in inspecting the progress of the con-
struction if held strictly liable for unreasonably dangerous defects. This
really would cast no greater burden upon them, for lending institutions
already owe a duty of care to stockholders to make sure housing on which
they loan money will be sound enough to serve as proper collateral. As
standard practice, savings and loan associations normally check soil condi-
tions for potential foundation hazards, usually at the borrower's expense;
inspect plans to insure that they are adapted to the building site; and check
for structural defects during the course of construction when lending
money for residential construction projects. 8
Under the strict liability theory, lenders of course would not have to
fear that they would be held accountable for any and all defects. The
theory is founded upon the idea that the house will be reasonably fit for
the purpose for which it is sold. Only if it is defective through a condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous to persons using it or to their property would
strict liability be imposed. 2
As illustrated by the fact situation in Connor, courts should consider
a number of factors in determining whether to impose strict liability on a
lender backing a builder-vendor. While the decisions necessarily must
develop on a case by case basis, the experience of the builder-vendor, its
solvency, the control exercised by the lending institution, and the degree
to which the lender becomes enmeshed in the enterprise are all highly
relevant elements for consideration concerning the ultimate issue of lender
liability. For instance, a lender that so involves itself in the housing
scheme that it in effect becomes an entrepreneur ought to bear the full
risks of its involvement to the extent of strict liability. Lenders financing
2, For a discussion speculating as to the effect of these risk-spreading devices
on the housing industry, see id. at 754-55.
"s UNITED STATES SAVINGS & LOAN LEAGUE, CONSTRUCTION LOAN PROCEDURES
5, 8, 36 (1966).
2 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965).
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inexperienced or financially-weak builders should under the Connor doc-
trine exercise control over the projects to insure sound construction; but
even if they choose not to do so, such lenders should be held strictly liable
for housing defects since their money launched the homes on the market.
On the other hand, lending institutions that provide money for experi-
enced, solvent builders and that are not negligent toward potential pur-
chasers for not exercising substantial control over the planning and con-
struction of the homes, and that do not involve themselves in the enter-
prise to an extent greater than lending money outright to the builder-
vendor should not face strict tort liability for defective homes. Indeed,
under the holding in Connor, they would not be liable in negligence. The
circumstances surrounding each case would determine, of course, the
weight a court would give each relevant element.
One difficulty in holding lenders strictly liable may be the issue of
whether the independent contractor who builds and sells one house at a
time should be held strictly liable for dangerous defects. It has been sug-
gested that courts may distinguish between the subdeveloper who builds
a number of homes and the independent contractor." However, both
Texas and Mississippi have declined to recognize any such distinction 1
and the New Jersey Supreme Court did not take the opportunity to do so
in a recent case.3 2 Logically lenders should not be held strictly liable
where there is no basis for such liability in the builders that they support.
But the decisions indicate that where courts are willing to apply strict
liability to builder-vendors, the size of their operation makes no difference.
Just as the large developer, the independent contractor
is in full control of the construction of the house and therefore is in
the best position to assume the responsibility for remedying structural
defects. If he reaps profits from his activities, he ought to bear the
risks involved in these activities. Consequently, he will use greater
care to protect the lives and property of users of the home.
3
" The basic argument in favor of such a distinction is that the small, independent
contractor is a poor risk-bearer and risk-shifter. See, e.g., Note, Builder-Vendors:
Liability for Negligence and for Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, 51
CORNELL L. REV. 389, 399-400 (1965); Note, 41 WASH. L. REv. 166, 172-73
(1966); Recent Developinents, the Strict Tort Liability of Builder-Vendors, 28
OHIO ST. L.J. 343, 352 (1967).
" State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, - Miss. -, 189 So. 2d 113, cert. denied, 386
U.S. 912 (1966); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
"Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 245 A.2d 1 (1968).
"Recent Developments, the Strict Tort Liability of Builder-Vendors, supra
note 30, at 351 (citations omitted).
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In short, the argument that the single contractor is often a poor risk-
bearer and risk-shifter can be obviated if the lender who backs him is
also held strictly liable.
Under any extension of strict liability to the lender, the builder-vendor
should remain primarily liable since he is the one with the most immediate
control over the construction. Then the lending agency can protect itself
not only by spreading the risk through interest rates on loans and requiring
the borrower to insure against products liability, but can also seek in-
demnification from a solvent builder who builds a defective house, at
least if the builder was actively negligent.3 4 These methods of protection
might make courts less reluctant in the future to extend the Connor prin-
ciple so that lenders financing builder-vendors are strictly liable for housing
defects.
When all arguments on the subject are examined, such vicarious strict
liability for lenders must rest on a social policy concept rather than on
a fault principle. But this is nothing new in the law of torts.
Vicarious liability is based on a relationship between the parties, irre-
spective of participation, either by act or omisson, of the one vicariously
liable, under which it has been determined as a matter of policy that
one person should be liable for the act of the other. Its true basis is
largely one of public or social policy under which it has been determined
that, irrespective of fault, a party should be held to respond for the acts
of another.3 5
THOMAS F. LOFLIN III
Torts-Municipal Corporations-Liability for Failure to Provide
Requested Police Protection Against-Assault by a Third Person
The doctrine of immunity for 'municipal corporations has long been
invoked to insulate municipalities from liability for the torts of their law
enforcement officials.' Even in those jurisdictions that have abolished
"See Comment, Liability of the Instit utional Lender for Strctueral Defects
in New Houtsing, supra note 3, at 760-61 & n.12 2 .
" Nadeau v. Melin, 260 Minn. 369, 375-76, 110 N.W.2d 29, 34 (1961) (citations
omitted).
1 On the doctrine of municipal immunity, see generally W. PROSSER, LAW or
TORTS 996-1013 (3rd ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. As to municipal
liability for the torts of law enforcement officials, see 18 E. MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS §§ 53.79-53.81a (3rd ed. 1963); Comment, Municipal Liability for
Police Torts: An Analysis of a Strand of American Legal History, 17 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 475 (1963).
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